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Resumen: Las percepciones sobre la democracia son relevantes para la estabilidad y 
sostenibilidad de los sistemas políticos. Las investigaciones previas han identificado al 
desarrollo económico y a la corrupción como dos factores que inciden de manera 
importante en las percepciones ciudadanas sobre el funcionamiento de la democracia. 
Sin embargo, poco se sabe acerca de la interacción entre estas dos variables. Este 
artículo evalúa los efectos de la economía y la corrupción, tanto a nivel individual como 
nacional, sobre la satisfacción de los ciudadanos respecto de la democracia. A través de 
un modelo de regresión multinivel es posible comprobar de manera sistemática el 
impacto de los indicadores de desarrollo económico y corrupción medidos a nivel 
nacional. También se examinan explicaciones alternativas a nivel individual para 22 
países de las Américas. Se presta especial atención a la interacción, por un lado, entre los 
niveles percibidos de corrupción y la victimización de la corrupción y, por el otro, los 
niveles de corrupción percibidos y el desarrollo económico a nivel nacional. Para esta 
investigación se utilizan los datos de la encuesta del Barómetro de las Américas 2008, 
del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo y de Transparencia 
Internacional.  





Abstract: Perceptions about democracy are relevant for the stability and sustainability 
of political systems. Previous research has identified economic development and 
corruption as two significant factors that impact citizens’ views about the way 
democracy works. However, little is known about the interaction between these two 
variables. This paper assesses the effects of the economy and corruption at both the 
national and individual levels on citizens’ democratic satisfaction. By employing a 
multilevel regression model, we are able to test systematically the indicators of economic 
development and corruption at the national level. We also test competing explanations 
at the individual level for twenty-two countries in the Americas.  We pay special 
attention to the interaction between perceived individual levels of corruption, 
corruption victimization, and perceived levels of corruption and economic development 
at the national level. For this research, we rely on survey data provided by the 
AmericasBarometer 2008, data from the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and Transparency International. 























Citizens’ attitudes toward the political system are essential for the development and 
sustainability of any democracy. One of the multiple dimensions of political support 
refers to regime performance, which has been widely addressed by assessing the levels of 
democratic satisfaction (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Fuch, Guidorossi and Svensson 
1995; Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Schechtel 2010). Previous research on this topic has 
focused on the determinants that explain these levels, among which certain economic 
factors stand out. Specifically, citizens’ perceptions about their personal and national 
economic situation and actual economic development influence evaluations of the way 
democracies work (Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg 1993; Kornberg and Clarke 1992; Chu, 
Bratton, Lagos, Shastri and Tessler 2008). Moreover, corruption has been identified as a 
practice that weakens the belief in the legitimacy of political systems (Stephen 1999; 
Seligson 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Chang and Chu 2006). While some 
scholars have examined independently the impact of certain individual and national 
factors on democratic satisfaction, little is known about the impact that the interactions 
between national levels of corruption perception, economic development and individual 
level characteristics have on democratic performance evaluations.  
In this paper, we aim to analyze satisfaction with the way democracy works in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Most of these nations belong to the so-called new 
democracies which experienced democratic transitions in recent decades and still face 
some challenges in their process of consolidation. Thus, evaluating the determinants of 
this regime performance indicator is especially relevant in a region still prone to political 
and economic instability. By employing a multilevel regression model, the main 
contribution of this work is to assess the effects of corruption and the economy at both 
the national and individual levels.  As Anderson and Guillory state ―a country’s context 
has rarely been incorporated explicitly into explanations of system support or satisfaction 
with democracy and political institutions‖ (Anderson and Guillory 1997) or when 
included, the relationship between individual and contextual variables has not been 
appropriately addressed (Wagner, Schneider and Halla 2009). With the help of survey 
data from the 2008 AmericasBarometer, data from the United Nations Development 





















effects of theoretically relevant variables at both levels on citizens’ democratic 
satisfaction.  
We are interested in responding to the following questions: 1) At the individual level, are 
individual economic and political perceptions related to satisfaction with democracy? 2) 
At the country level, are different levels of corruption perception and economic 
development linked to democratic satisfaction? 3) The interaction between levels: Are the 
effects of individual economic and political perceptions moderated by national economic 
and political performance?  
At the individual level, we expect that citizens in the Americas who positively evaluate 
their national and personal economic situation and political performance (e.g., the fight 
against corruption) will be more satisfied with the way democracy works. Our main 
contribution, nonetheless, rests on the interaction between national economic 
development, corruption perception and personal experiences with corruption. We 
assume that different levels of economic development at the national level generate 
different expectations among citizens, which is going to affect their evaluations about the 
performance of the political system. We know for instance that affluent countries 
experience less corruption (Treisman 2000) and that economic development reduces 
incentives and opportunities to incur corrupt practices (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000). 
Moreover, in open societies where ―equal treatment applies to everyone regardless of the 
group to which one belongs‖ (Mungiu 2006), the opportunity for corrupt practices 
decreases and become less common.  Individuals living in less corrupt societies will tend 
to experience less corruption and become intolerant toward these practices when they 
happen, resulting in higher levels of perceived corruption, which in turn, will reduce 
democratic satisfaction. The dissatisfaction of these citizens relates to ―the failure of their 
governments to provide, at a minimum, rule of law, and at the maximum, fair policy 
making that does not favor certain groups over others‖ (Mungiu 2006). Conversely, 
notwithstanding the well documented negative effects of corruption, citizens in less 
developed societies (which tend to be more corrupt nations) will be more receptive to 
corruption as citizens in these nations will be more likely accustomed to these practices, 
moderating its negative effect on democratic satisfaction, that is, the impact will be much 
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Figure I shows cross-national variations of satisfaction with democracy in the Latin 
American and Caribbean region. We first note that nations with the highest levels of 
democratic satisfaction are Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Venezuela with averages above 55 
points on a 0-100 scale1. At the other end, Haiti and Paraguay exhibit, on average, 38.9 
and 30.2 points on the same scale. Moreover, half of the countries locate themselves 
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We also illustrate national-level economic and political characteristics. Figure II shows 
that national wealth, measured by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, varies 
significantly across countries, with Mexico and Chile on top and Nicaragua and Haiti at 
the bottom. Only five countries exceed the average regional national wealth of $6,780 in 
2008. These figures demonstrate the marked differences in wealth between nations 
across Latin America and the Caribbean. Take for instance Mexico and Chile at the 
higher end and Paraguay and Haiti at the lower end, the differences are striking. 
Paraguayan and Haitian national wealth correspond to only 21.8% and 6.6%, 
respectively, of that of Mexico. Similar percentages are shown with respect to Chile’s 
national wealth. Therefore, it is not surprising that both countries show the lowest 
satisfaction with democracy in the region. Though certain countries in between these two 
extremes do not match this pattern, there does appear to be some aggregate relationship 
between satisfaction with democracy and a country’s economic performance. Perhaps 
one reason some countries do not conform to the general pattern is their experiences 
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Figure III also shows that national perceived levels of corruption, measured by the 
Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, vary significantly across 
countries. Keep in mind that higher numbers denote more transparent nations and lower 
numbers represent highly perceived corrupt nations. Chile and Uruguay, for instance, are 
the most transparent nations in Latin America, whereas Ecuador, Venezuela and Haiti 
are the most corrupt.  Uruguay, a rich country that displays the lowest perceived levels of 
corruption, also shows the most satisfied citizens with democracy in the region. Haiti, on 
the other hand, a poor and highly corrupt nation, shows the least satisfied citizens, after 
Paraguay (Figure I). Yet Chile remains one of the wealthiest and more transparent 
nations in Latin America, but also exhibits low levels of democratic satisfaction. What 
makes Chilean citizens dissatisfied with the way their democracy works despite Chile’s 





















These results provide preliminary evidence in support for our expectations that rich 
countries tend to be less corrupt and more satisfied with the way democracy works, on 
the one hand, and poor nations are more likely to be perceived as highly corrupt and less 
satisfied with their democracies, on the other.2 Still, cases such as Chile indicate that a 
country’s successful economic development do not necessarily translate into high level of 
democratic satisfaction. We turn next, to explain why.  
The remainder of this article examines the theoretical framework on which this paper is 
based, followed by a description of the data and method employed, and concludes with a 
discussion of the results and the corresponding implications of the analyses.  
II. Theory 
New democracies in Latin America are facing several problems that undermine the 
quality of those democracies. One of these problems is the lack of accountability, both 
vertical and horizontal (Mainwaring and Welna 2003; O´Donnel 1999; Peruzzotti and 
Smulovitz 2006), which highlights the disconnection between citizens and government 
and among different government agencies. One of the results of this lack of 
accountability is the persistence of corruption in the region.   
High levels of corruption have important effects on citizens’ opinions and attitudes, such 
as the erosion of political trust or legitimacy (Canache and Allison 2005) and 
interpersonal trust (Morris and Klesner 2010).  However, little is known about the effects 
of corruption in different contexts. In other words, is the impact of corruption on 
attitudes towards democracy the same across different economic contexts and/or 
national levels of corruption perception? We explore this question in the specific case of 
Latin America, a region still facing problems of high corruption despite marked 
economic improvements in recent years. By taking into consideration the discussion on 
the different indicators that could be used to analyze attitudes toward democracy, we 
                                                        
2 The correlations between low national levels of corruption perception (CPI) and national wealth (GDP) is 
0.62; CPI and democracy (measured by the Freedom House Organization) is 0.76; and GDP and democracy 






















focus on regime performance as a way to measure how democratic political systems 
function in practice, according to citizens in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
Despite a long debate related to what exactly measures citizens’ satisfaction with 
democracy3 or the possible multiple interpretations of this concept (Canache, Mondak 
and Seligson 2001; Norris 1999), we join some scholars who consider this question as a 
valid and reliable indicator of attitudes toward the political system and of how citizens 
view the current regime (Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson 1995; Linde and Ekman 2003; 
Sarsfield and Echegaray 2006; Karp, Banducci and Bowler 2003). In sum, we are 
interested in perceptions of how democracy performs in practice, instead of support for 
the ideal of democracy. Put differently, we want to assess people’s responses to actual 
system performance, which is essential in building political legitimacy (Anderson and 
Tverdova 2003; Gilley 2006).   
As many scholars have demonstrated, political legitimacy has important effects on how 
citizens participate or interact with their political systems (Booth and Seligson 2005; 
Norris 1999). Therefore, the study of satisfaction with democracy is especially significant 
given the implications that it has for other essential elements of democracy.  
What explains satisfaction with democracy? Previous research has shown that democratic 
satisfaction is related to both economic and political factors, although there is an ongoing 
debate about which of them prevails over the other (Przeworsky, Álvarez, Cheibub and 
Limongi 2000; Converse and Kapstein 2006; Rueschemeyer, Huber and Stephens 1992; 
Boix and Stokes 2003). On the one hand, the economy is one of the key factors shaping 
attitudes toward democracy in general. Scholars have found that perceptions of personal 
and national economic conditions are linked to system support and satisfaction with the 
way democracy works (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg 1993; 
Chu et al. 2008; Dalton 2004; Kornberg and Clarke 1992; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 
1998; Seligson and Smith 2010). This relationship between economic perceptions and 
satisfaction with democracy derives from the importance that citizens give to system 
outputs or its performance (Weatherford 1984; Mattes and Bratton 2001 and 2007; Smith 
                                                        
3 Traditionally, scholars have used the following question as a measure of democratic support or 
satisfaction: ―In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied 






















2005). As Lipset (1981) argues, economic uncertainty generates insecurity that affects 
citizens’ political attitudes. If democracy is able to provide economic goods and citizens 
are satisfied with these outputs they are more likely to have general positive attitudes 
toward democracy. In other words, citizens evaluate the costs and benefits linked with 
democratic performance and side themselves with arrangements that better serve their 
interests. If citizens feel that their governments have not fulfilled their promises of 
economic well-being, their satisfaction with the way democracy works will be weakened; 
whereas the opposite is true if citizens’ expectations of both overarching national 
economic wealth and individual economic wealth are met. Even though some research 
suggests that political variables matter far more than economic considerations in shaping 
citizens’ views toward democracy (Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Anderson 1998; 
Hofferbert and Klingemmann 1999), there is widespread agreement (Anderson and 
Guillory 1997; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Booth and Seligson 2009; Salinas and 
Booth 2011) of the systematic effects of economic performance on the way people 
evaluate their political systems (Linde and Ekman 2003).  As a result, we expect that the 
more dissatisfied Latin American citizens are with their personal and national economic 
situation, the more they will express negative opinions regarding the way democracy 
works.   
Moreover, the benefits of national economic development are palpable as prosperous 
societies are more likely to provide goods and services to their populations. Specifically, 
in economically developed states, citizens are better able to meet their basic needs and 
self-develop (Amartya 1999). We expect, therefore, different effects on democratic 
satisfaction depending on the level of development.  Once we take into consideration the 
impact of context on individuals’ perceptions, it is possible that an individual living in a 
wealthy nation with a certain set of economic characteristics is more likely to express 
higher levels of democratic satisfaction than a person with the same set of characteristics 
in a poor nation. Thus, we not only anticipate that affluent societies produce more 
favorable conditions for democracy and a context to develop support and satisfaction 
with the way that system works, but we also expect that varying levels of national wealth 
will have a moderating effect on citizens’ democratic satisfaction. As we mention later, 
we conjecture that experiences with corruption at the individual level will influence 





















Another key aspect of regime performance is how problems of corruption are addressed. 
Corruption is one of the most severe and ever-present problems in the developing world, 
not only because of its well-known detrimental effects on economic growth (Mauro 
1995; Seyf 2001; Drury, Krieckhauss and Lusztig 2006), but also because it weakens the 
belief in the legitimacy of the political system (Morris 1999; Seligson 2002; Anderson and 
Tverdova 2003). 
What is corruption and why is it relevant for satisfaction with democracy? Corruption 
has been more generally defined as ―the improper use of public office in exchange for 
private gain‖ (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000). Corruption is important because it 
undermines attitudes toward democracy since it serves as a signal that laws are not 
administered equitably and fairly, and that citizens do not have the same rights and access 
to the public arena. Even though previous research shows that corruption affects the 
perception of authorities and institutional performance rather than support for 
democracy in general (Canache and Allison 2005), we might expect that this failure of the 
rule of law undermines citizens’ faith in the democratic process. This research is relevant 
for our study as it shows that despite the general public’s dissatisfaction with democratic 
processes, the overall impact of corruption rests on its procedures and not on its support 
as a form of government. In other words, corruption negatively affects citizens’ 
satisfaction with democracy in practice.  
Corruption undermines democratic rule especially when public goods are accessible only 
for those individuals who have connections and/or have the means to pay for those 
services (Treisman 2000). Specifically, services will be offered only if bribes are paid, 
denying those services to those who are underprivileged, consequently resulting ―in 
uneven and often inferior services to many‖ (Seligson 2002). As Sandholtz and Koetzle 
point out ―corruption erodes some of the core values of a democracy, namely, that 
collective decision should emerge from public processes guided by known rules, and that 
all citizens should have equal access to those processes‖ (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000). 
In short, corrupt practices corrode the rule of law by violating important principles of 
democratic governance such as transparency and equal treatment applied to everyone. It 
is well-known that without the appropriate functioning of institutions, democracy is 
damaged (North 1999). Thus, we expect that if a great number of the citizenry does not 





















themselves constantly paying for services that should be publicly available, the more 
likely they will become dissatisfied with their political systems.  
Another point of consideration is the connection between the incidence of corrupt 
practices and the wealth of nations. In countries where incomes are quite low, the 
economy produces minimal wealth for the average citizen. As Sandholtz and Koetzle’s 
also points out ―low average incomes create certain structural incentives for corrupt 
behaviors […] paying a bribe can be worth the expense and risk if it is likely to result in 
greater gains in income; receiving a bribe produces a direct boost in income‖ (Mungiu 
2006; Tanzi and Davoodi 2002; Treisman 2000). We anticipate, then, that a person living 
in an affluent nation will be less likely to experience corrupt behavior than a person with 
the same set of characteristics in a poor nation. When she experiences corruption, 
nonetheless, the impact will be much stronger on her dissatisfaction with democracy. 
While one expects that different levels of national wealth will have a moderating effect 
on citizens’ democratic satisfaction, the strength of the relationship between corruption 
victimization and democratic satisfaction is less clear to assess.  
Affluent nations are more likely to enjoy a ―working rule of law‖ or ―working 
institutions‖ compared to that of poorer nations. And as economic development has 
been linked with more transparent and open societies, and at the same time, associated 
with less corruption (Mungiu 2006; Tanzi and Davoodi 2002), opportunities for corrupt 
behavior are likely to decrease and become less frequent. Explicitly, in established 
democracies, the citizenry enjoys, at least in theory, equality of opportunity before the 
state and government officials are more accountable to the public as they have a duty to 
the collective will. At the same time, the public has the right to evaluate the conduct of 
public officials and punish them for corrupt practices. Poorer nations, on the other hand, 
are well known for their institutional deficiencies and inadequacy at fighting corruption. 
Highly corrupt societies, which tend to be poorer nations, may lack all type of 
enforcement. We anticipate, therefore, that the more citizens encounter corrupt practices 
in developed and less corrupt societies where laws are administered equitably and fairly 
and where citizens have equal rights and access to the public arena, the more negatively 
they will perceive the performance of their political institutions and show a higher 





















On the other hand, individuals who experience multiple corrupt practices in less 
developed societies and more corrupt nations may be more accustomed to these 
practices and perhaps develop a culture of ―tolerance‖ toward corrupt behavior. Even 
though experiences with corruption may be frequent in practice, citizen perceived levels 
of corruption will remain low. As Sandholtz and Koetzle suggest ―the public will not care 
about detecting, publicizing, and punishing corrupt acts unless broadly shared norms 
treat corruption as antagonistic to basic democratic values‖ (Sandholtz and Koetzle 
2000), or as Seligson found in his 2002 study of corruption, ―results support the view 
that when respondents do not see bribery as a corrupt act, they do not blame the political 
system for such acts‖ (Seligson 2002). In short, corruption is detrimental for democracy 
because even if citizens reside in countries where corruption is a more ―accepted‖ 
practice, the overall negative effect on satisfaction with democracy is at work (Anderson 
and Tverdova 2003).    
In the following section, we present a model that combines both individual and national 
level characteristics. Our intention is to assess the extent to which citizens’ satisfaction 
with democracy is dependent upon both economic and political factors while taking into 
account national levels of perceived corruption and economic development.  
III. Data and Methods 
In order to assess the effects of both political and economic factors at the individual and 
national levels on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy, we rely on a multilevel analysis. 
Even though there is an emerging availability of multi-country survey data, the majority 
of studies depend on either individual or aggregate analyses, preventing the simultaneous 
analysis of the effects of both individual and country level characteristics on citizens’ 
satisfaction with democracy.  Analyses at the individual level can only assume that low 
levels of economic development and high levels of corruption in some nations may 
negatively affect citizens’ satisfaction with the way democracy works, but are unable to 
demonstrate this association empirically. Analyses at the country level, in contrast, 
speculate that national characteristics –corruption and economic development– influence 
democratic satisfaction, but fail to explain how individuals in corrupt and poorer nations 





















corrupt nations. In other words, national level factors may have direct effects, but they 
also may act as intermediary variables, moderating or intensifying the role of individual 
level factors. In this study, we hope to address these limitations with the aid of multilevel 
methods (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002), which take into account both the individual and 
country level nature of the data and the interaction between both. 
The data we employ in this project comes from the AmericasBarometer 2008, involving 
face-to-face interviews conducted in most of Latin America and the Caribbean, totaling 
22 nations4. The project used national probability samples of voting-age adults. The 
merged file includes over 37,000 respondents.5   
In order to understand the impact of national-level factors and the interaction between 
levels, we employ data from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
Transparency International (TI). The national wealth of countries is measured by an index 
based on gross domestic product per capita in purchasing power parity terms in US 
dollars. The index can take values between 0 and 1.6 National corruption, on the other 
hand, is measured by the IT Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which is determined by 
―expert assessments and opinion surveys.‖ The CPI ranks countries on a scale from 10 
(very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt).7    
By employing a hierarchical linear model (HLM), we now proceed to the analysis of these 
questions to better understand the factors that help shape an individual’s satisfaction with 
democracy. 
                                                        
4 Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, 
the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. In this paper we exclude Canada and the United States.  
5 It corresponds to around 1,500 respondents per country, with the exception of Bolivia and Ecuador that 
have around 3,000 respondents. We include a weight to compensate for those countries. For more 
information on these surveys, See www.lapopsurveys.org. 
6 For details on how this index was constructed see UNDP’S Human Development Report 2007/2008. 
Argentina is the country that ranks highest in this indicator (0.828) and Haiti is the country located at the 
lower extreme (0.469).  
7 For details on how this index was constructed see 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi. The CPI 2008 ranks Chile as ―clean‖ 





















IV. Analytical Strategy 
We describe three ways by which political and economic factors might influence citizens’ 
satisfaction with democracy. First, we begin with our dependent variable, satisfaction 
with democracy, which is an individual’s response to the following question: ―In general, 
would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with 
the way democracy works in [name of the country]?‖ (Figure I). This item has been 
widely used in the literature of satisfaction with democracy.   
Then we incorporate various economic indicators that previous research suggests 
influence regime performance evaluations, such as respondents’ personal economic 
conditions and their views of the country’s macroeconomic situation. These variables 
include a measure of individual wealth with an index of household goods ownership8  
and a measure of the state of employment (recoded into unemployed=1). It is likely that 
individuals who lost their jobs are more dissatisfied with the way their democracy works 
than their working counterparts. Then ordinal items that ask interviewees their views of 
their personal and national economic situation are incorporated to evaluate the idiotropic 
and sociotropic dimension of economic conditions. The items asked: ―How would you 
describe your personal economic situation? Would you say that it is very bad; bad; 
neither good nor bad; good; very good?‖ ―How would you describe your country’s 
economic situation? Would you say that it is very bad; bad; neither good nor bad; good; 
very good?‖ With the inclusion of these multiple measures of economic perceptions and 
experiences, we hope to capture the role that these factors play in people’s satisfaction 
with democracy.  
The second group of variables represents how political factors impact satisfaction with 
democracy. We seek to incorporate citizens’ assessment of government performance into 
the model. To meet this end, we examine respondents’ direct experience with corruption 
victimization and perceived corruption levels. Fortunately, the Latin American Public 
Opinion Project has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization.  An 
                                                        
8 This item was developed by researchers of the Latin American Public Opinion Project as a way to tease 
out some concerns with respect to a possible effect of social desirability when asked about income levels. 
The index consists of a series of items asking interviewees if they possess or not the following items: 
television set, refrigerator, conventional telephone, cellular telephone, vehicle, microwave oven, 
motorcycle, running water, indoor plumbing and computer. Positive responses are then summed to 





















example of questions asked to define corrupt practices is: ―Within the last year, have you 
had to pay a bribe to a government official?‖. Similar questions about bribery demands 
were asked at the level of local government, in the public schools, at work, in the courts, 
in public health facilities, etc. This series allows us to assess the frequency of citizens’ 
direct experiences with corruption as well as to construct overall scales of corruption 
victimization. The index of corruption victimization goes from 0-6.9 In addition, the 
variable that gauges perceptions of corruption asks: ―Taking into account your own 
experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is very common, 
common, uncommon, or very uncommon?‖. Given that the main objective of this article 
is to analyze the impact of national levels of perceived corruption on citizens’ satisfaction 
with democracy, we do not focus on the impact of different types of corruption 
victimization at the individual level. Instead, we pay special attention to the perception 
and frequency of experiences with corruption. 
Scholars consistently highlight the influence that perceptions about the government’s 
performance in delivering economic and political goods exercise on democratic 
satisfaction (Bratton and Mattes 2001).  We expect, then, that positive evaluations of the 
current administration have a positive effect on the levels of democratic satisfaction 
across the region. An index of the perception of government efficacy in order to control 
for citizens’ support for the current administration is incorporated.10 The index mainly 
focuses on citizens’ perception of government performance including the fight against 
poverty, corruption, unemployment, safety improvement and the protection of 
democratic principles. In addition, political interest helps us gauge the impact of other 
political factors. This item asks: How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, 
little or none?  
                                                        
9 The questions asked included in the index of corruption victimization are: Has a police officer ask you for 
a bribe during the past year? During the past year did any government employee ask you for a bribe? 
During the past year, to process any kind of document (like a license, for example), did you have to pay any 
money above that required by law? At your workplace, have you been bribed within the past year? Did you 
have to pay a bribe to the courts within the past year?  In order to receive attention in a hospital or a clinic 
during the past year, did you have to pay a bribe? Have you had to pay a bribe at school during the past 
year? For a more detailed discussion of this index see Seligson (2006). 
10 The index of Government Efficacy was created from the following questions: To what extent would you 
say the current administration fights poverty? To what extent would you say the current administration 
promotes and protects democratic principles? To what extent would you say the current administration 
combats government corruption? To what extent would you say the current administration improves the 
security of citizens? To what extent would you say the current administration combats unemployment? 





















The third and final group of variables include a respondent’s age (measured in years), sex 
(recoded into female=1), level of education (years of education), and an ordinal measure 
of the size of their community (measures size of cities from smaller to larger). All of 
these seek to control for socio-demographic characteristics.11  
In the first portion of the analysis, besides our traditional socioeconomic variables, we 
focus on individual level economic and political factors already described above and their 
relationship with satisfaction with democracy.  This individual-level model is illustrated as 
follows: 
Yij=  0j + 1j*(CORRUPTION VICTIMIZATION)ij  +2j*(CORRUPTION PERCEPTION)ij 
+3j*(GOVERNMENT EFFICACY)ij+ 4j*(POLITICAL INTEREST)ij 
+5j*(IDIOTROPIC)ij +6j*(SOCIOTROPIC)ij  + 7j *(EDUCATION)ij 
+8j*(AGE)ij + 9j*(FEMALE)ij + 10j*(WEALTH)ij 11j*(CITY SIZE)ij 
+12j*(UNEMPLOYED)ij + Rij 
 
where Yij represents average levels of satisfaction with democracy for an individual i in 
country j, and 0j is the individual level intercept 1j …12j are the effects of the variables 
included in our model. Finally, Rij is the error term. 
Our second analytical strategy pertains to the effects of country level factors. Specifically, 
we expect that, irrespective of individual political and economic characteristics, Latin 
American citizens living in more affluent and transparent societies will show higher levels 
of satisfaction with democracy. The specific country-level equation for the model 
intercept is as follows: 
0j = γ00+ γ01*(CORRUPTION)ij + γ02*(ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT)ij + U0j 
where γ00 is the country level intercept and γ01 and γ02 are the effects of corruption and 
national wealth on the model intercept (0j). 
                                                        
11 Responses to most questions have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100 for ease of comparison with other 
variables. Specifically, variables on a 4 point scale (satisfaction with democracy) were rescaled to a 0-100 
point scale by subtracting the variable from 1, dividing it by 3 and multiplying it by 100.  Same procedure 
was done on 1-7 scale. The numerator, in these cases, was divided by 6 instead. For further information on 
all these variables and access to the complete survey instrument, see the Latin American Public Opinion 





















Our third and final analytical approach is to explore the possibility of linking levels of 
analysis (individual and national) by including interaction effects in the model. We 
conjecture that the strength of the impact of individual political factors, namely, 
perception and corruption victimization might be moderated by a country’s levels of 
corruption perception and economic development. To illustrate this point, let’s take for 
instance a poor person who exhibits high levels of corruption perception and 
victimization in Mexico or Chile, this person is likely to express higher levels of 
dissatisfaction with the way democracy works than a person with similar characteristics 
living in Haiti or Paraguay. Because affluent nations are more likely to enjoy a ―working 
rule of law‖ or ―working institutions‖, they are also less likely to be mired by corruption 
when compared to poorer nations. Thus, citizens who live in less corrupt and more 
economically developed societies are more likely to perceive the performance of their 
political institutions negatively and become dissatisfied with the way democracy works 
when they become frequent victims of corruption. The cross-level interaction equations 
are as follows: 
1j = γ10+ γ11*(CORRUPTION)ij + γ12*(ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT)ij + U1j 
2j = γ20+ γ21*(CORRUPTION)ij + γ22*(ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT)ij + U2j 
kj = γk 
where γ10 is the intercept for the corruption victimization slope (1j), and γ11 is the 
effect of national corruption perception and γ12 is the effect of economic development. 
Also, γ20 is the intercept for the corruption perception slope (2j), and γ21 is the effect of 
national corruption perception and γ22 is the effect of economic development. γk are the 
remaining individual level variables. 
Our expectation with all of these performance measures is that  the more negative views 
and experiences with political and economic performance citizens have, combined with 
national levels of perceived corruption and lower levels of economic development, will 






















We employ a multilevel regression model using HLM 6.0 software. Results of the three 
models analyzed are shown in Table I.  The first column in Table I displays the results 
from our baseline model including only the individual-level variables (Model I). Next, we 
introduce the country-level variables for the model intercept (Model II) only. The full 
model (Model III) examines the interaction effects between the individual and country 
level characteristics. When we look at the results of our baseline model, the predicted 
level of satisfaction with democracy is 49.65 holding the rest of variables at their mean.12   
Among our key economic variables, both idiotropic and sociotropic considerations 
increase significantly citizens’ democratic satisfaction. These results lend support to the 
notion that the more positive view individuals hold toward their personal and national 
economic conditions, the more pleased they are with the political system’s capacity to 
meet their basic needs.   
Political factors also influence the extent to which citizens’ view favorably their political 
systems. As we expected, individuals who are satisfied with their government 
performance show favorable views toward democracy. The higher the frequency of 
becoming targets of corruption victimization, in contrast, diminishes this satisfaction. 
Taking all of these results together, they provide further evidence that socioeconomic 
characteristics as well as individual economic and political factors matter when explaining 
citizens’ satisfaction with the way democracy performs. It is worth noting that individual 
perceived levels of corruption did not yield statistically significant results. 
The final set of variables relates to our traditional socio-economic variables. The only 
variables that did not yield statistically significant results were gender and wealth. Not 
surprisingly, the young and the unemployed tend to be less satisfied with the way 
democracy works. It is well known that Latin America is one of the regions with the 
highest unemployment rates among the young population (World Bank 2010). In 
                                                        
12 Multilevel models presented in this paper were computed using the statistical package HLM 6. Variables 
that we were interested in evaluating their effects for the entire population in the sample were grand mean 
centered. On the other hand, variables that we considered that their effects vary across countries were 
group-mean centered (corruption perception and victimization). Because our variables at level II are 
continuous (economic development and corruption perception), both were grand mean centered. For a 





















addition, highly educated individuals tend to express higher levels of dissatisfaction 
(Norris 1999). These results may reflect that higher levels of sophistication generate more 
critical citizens. As we mentioned at the beginning of this article, socio-economic 
characteristics play a role in determining democratic satisfaction. For instance, education 
and wealth may be related to the extent to which citizens express democratic satisfaction. 
In particular, more educated individuals are more likely to be aware of the political 
system with which they live than those who are less informed and, therefore, are more 
likely to be in a position to be critical of those systems that do not deliver. At the same 
time, education is related to income, which leads us to expect that individuals who have 
both higher income and education are more likely to be targets of corrupt practices 
because of their ―deeper pockets‖ (Seligson 2002; Orcés 2009) when compared to poorer 
individuals.13  Moreover, these individuals tend to live in urban/metropolitan areas where 
more public institutions are available and where the incidence of corrupt practices is 
higher. If they are frequent victims of corruption, they will express a higher 
discontentment with the way their political system functions.  
The bottom of Table I displays the variance components. These are used to assess 
whether the inclusion of country-level variables in Models II and III improve the ability to 
explain cross-national variations in democratic satisfaction levels. The components in 
Model I serve as baseline measures, indicating the amount of variance between countries 
that remains unexplained. As we incorporate the country level variables, corruption 
perception and economic development, in Models II and III, the change in size of the 
components tell us how much variance is explained. The components at the bottom of 
Model I show that the intercept and the effects of corruption victimization and 
perception vary significantly across countries. 
Model II includes our country-level variables for the model intercept— corruption 
perception measured by the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International) 
and national wealth measured by GDP index. It shows that at the national level, the only 
statistically significant variable that matters is economic development,14 while, contrary to 
                                                        
13 However, a recent work shows that poor citizens are more likely to be victims of corruption (Fried, 
Lagunes and Venkataramani 2010). 
14 Multilevel analyses were carried out with other level II variables that are theoretically related to 
democratic satisfaction. Among these are inflation rates, inequality (Gini Index), GDP per Capita Growth 
Rate, and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in Billions and per Capita. Unfortunately, none of these variables 





















our expectation, perceived levels of corruption do not. Finally, as the variance 
component for the intercept indicates, our significant national-level characteristic 
substantially improves the explanatory power of our model. There is a 20 percent 










































                                                                                                                                                               
measure of corruption perception, suggesting that the best predictor of satisfaction with democracy at level 































Full Model with 
Interaction Effects 
Intercept 49.649***(1.505) 49.657***(1.291) 49.653***(1.275) 
Individual-Level    
Socioeconomic    
     Education -0.271***(0.045) -0.272***(0.045) -0.272***(0.045) 
     Age 0.029** (0.011) 0.029** (0.011) 0.029** (0.011) 
     Female -0.007 (0.296) -0.004 (0.296) -0.007 (0.295) 
     Wealth 0.016 (0.114) 0.017 (0.113) 0.015 (0.114) 
     Size of City/Town -0.704*** (0.171) -0.704*** (0.171) -0.704*** (0.171) 
     Unemployed -1.186** (0.432) -1.188** (0.432) -1.184** (0.432) 
Economic Factors    
     Personal economic 
     Situation 0.093***(0.013) 0.093***(0.013) 0.093***(0.013) 
     Macroeconomic 
     Situation 0.142***(0.009) 0.142***(0.009) 0.142***(0.009) 
Political Factors    
     Corruption Victimization -1.169**(0.441) -1.139**(0.442) -1.162**(0.376) 
         CORRUPTION   (CPI)   0.482 (0.343) 
         ECON. DEVELOPMENT  (GDP)   -14.561*(5.289) 
     Corruption Perception -0.014 (0.009) -0.014 (0.009) -0.014 (0.009) 
         CORRUPTION   (CPI)   -0.001 (0.009) 
         ECON. DEVELOPMENT  (GDP)   0.012 (0.145) 
     Government Efficacy 0.234*** (0.017) 0.234*** (0.017) 0.234*** (0.017) 
     Political Interest 0.006 (0.007) 0.006 (0.007) 0.006 (0.007) 
Country-Level Intercepts Effects    
         CORRUPTION   (CPI)  1.002 (1.115) 0.545 (1.349) 
         ECON. DEVELOPMENT  (GDP)  23.816*(10.653) 37.471**(12.411) 
Variance Components: 
(Remaining between-country 
variance)    
     Intercept 51.827*** 41.274*** 41.069***   
          Percent explained  20% 21% 
     Corruption Victimization 3.817*** 3.878*** 3.105*** 
          Percent explained   19% 
     Corruption Perception 0.00245*** 0.00244*** 0.00278*** 
          Percent explained   0% 
Note: Entries are restricted maximum likelihood unstandardized coefficients estimated with HLM 6.0. For a 
detailed explanation of coding, see Appendices 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001     Number of Countries = 1915     Number of Cases = 31760 
Sources: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 2008, UNDP’s Human Development Report 2007/2008, Transparency 
International 2008. 
 
                                                        
15 We recognize our data limitations: a small number of cases at level II.  All these cases represent the 
majority of countries in the Americas, the focus of our study. Despite the data limitations, we did not 





















The final step for our analytical strategy is the introduction of cross-level interaction 
terms for corruption perception and victimization with economic development and 
perceived national corruption. Model III indicates that once again the only term that has a 
significant impact on the satisfaction with democracy is economic development. Put 
differently, the effect of corruption victimization on the satisfaction with democracy is 
moderated by nations’ economic development. A graph speaking to this effect is found 
below. 
Figure IV. The Effect of Corruption Victimization on Satisfaction with Democracy Moderated by 
Economic Development (Slopes Illustrates High and Low End of Country’s Economic Development) 






        Frequency of Corruption Victimization (Past Year)
   



















GDP  (index) = - 0.053
GDP  (index) =  0.060
 
We see that as citizens pay bribes more frequently in order to carry out their transactions 
–be it at the local government, in public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health 
facilities– the higher their level of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works.  The 
negative effect of corruption on democratic satisfaction is stronger in nations with higher 
levels of economic development than in less developed societies, illustrated by the very 
steep slope denoting well-off nations. This evidence suggests that the wealth of nations 
matters for citizens’ perceptions about the performance of their political systems, in 
contrast to what the previous literature utilizing multilevel techniques states (Wells and 





















The changes in the variance components further support the significance of economic 
development. In terms of the model intercept, the unexplained cross-national variance 
decreases from 52 with just individual-level variables to 41 in the full model, and a 21 
percent increase in the overall explanatory power of satisfaction with democracy. In 
addition, the interaction term of corruption victimization decreases the unexplained 
varying effect for the individual-level factors by 19%, respectively. 
Contrary to our initial expectations, national and individual levels of perceived corruption 
did not reach statistical significance, suggesting that what really matters for citizens’ views 
of democracy is their countries’ economic performance regardless of corruption 
perceived levels. 
VI. Conclusion  
Citizens’ satisfaction with the way democracy works is an essential factor not only for the 
survival of any democracy, but also for political legitimacy, which has persistently been 
demonstrated to have significant effects on essential democratic elements such as 
political participation. Deepening our understanding of the variables that explain this 
satisfaction will help us have healthier democracies, especially in Latin America, a region 
with young democracies in the process of consolidation. The political science literature 
has tried to evaluate the relationship between socio-economic contexts and democracy. 
In this article, we examined the different effects that individual level variables such as 
corruption victimization, perceptions about the economy and corruption, among others, 
have on satisfaction with democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean region. 
However, we looked at this relationship from a novel perspective, combining both 
individual and contextual levels. We have shown the different effects that these 
individual variables have on democratic evaluations depending on the national economic 
context. Specifically, we found that the effect of corruption victimization on satisfaction 
with the way democracy works is stronger in countries with high levels of economic 
development. On the contrary, being a victim of corruption in a poor nation does not 
have such a strong impact. These results highlight the importance of the national context 
when testing the relationship between individual level variables. Conventional wisdom 





















However, as we have shown in this article, the strength of this relationship depends on 
the economic development of nations and not necessarily on national perceived levels of 
corruption. 
Also, in line with most research, we have shown the importance of economic perceptions 
when citizens evaluate their satisfaction with democracy at the individual level. Negative 
perceptions of the personal and national economic situation erode satisfaction with 
democracy.  Further, it is noteworthy how actual experiences with corruption are more 
significant than mere perceptions as both of our corruption perception indicators at the 
national and individual levels yield statistically insignificant results, contrary to our initial 
expectations.  
In sum, the analysis of individual and national factors and its implications for 
democracies is a complex one in which the interactions between different levels play a 
great role. National contexts produce different opportunities, expectations, and 
conditions that influence individual democratic attitudes and the overall quality of 
democracy. In wealthy nations, democratic satisfaction is adversely affected by increased 
corruption. On the other hand, notwithstanding corruption’s weaker impact in 
economically disadvantaged countries, the overall negative effects of corruption persist. 
We conclude, therefore, that anti‐corruption programs are likely to be most successful 
when they combine localized action with broader attempts to increase economic 
development. Latin American countries have the challenge of creating the conditions in 
which citizens will no longer face corruption while increasing the belief that governments 
accomplish their objectives and satisfy their economic demands. Also, in line with most 
research, we have shown the importance of economic perceptions when citizens evaluate 
their satisfaction with democracy at the individual level. Negative perceptions of the 
personal and national economic situation erode satisfaction with democracy.  Further, it 
is noteworthy how actual experiences with corruption are more significant than mere 
perceptions as both of our corruption perception indicators at the national and individual 
levels yield statistically insignificant results, contrary to our initial expectations.  
In sum, the analysis of individual and national factors and its implications for 
democracies is a complex one in which the interactions between different levels play a 





















conditions that influence individual democratic attitudes and the overall quality of 
democracy. In wealthy nations, democratic satisfaction is adversely affected by increased 
corruption. On the other hand, notwithstanding corruption’s weaker impact in 
economically disadvantaged countries, the overall negative effects of corruption persist. 
We conclude, therefore, that anti‐corruption programs are likely to be most successful 
when they combine localized action with broader attempts to increase economic 
development. Latin American countries have the challenge of creating the conditions in 
which citizens will no longer face corruption while increasing the belief that governments 
accomplish their objectives and satisfy their economic demands. 
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Argentina 84.46  27.45 33.75 42.23 53.01  46.11  
Belize 68.36  19.00 44.55 35.06 42.85  33.41  
Bolivia 72.67  31.26 51.44 32.54 49.69  42.47  
Brazil 69.29  11.48 43.51 31.50 50.43  46.45  
Chile 65.85  11.65 50.84 22.74 48.34  46.83 
Colombia 72.32  9.51 54.37 37.60 52.84  45.71  
Costa Rica 72.13  17.46 53.05 26.87 50    43.13  
Dominican 
Republic 74.52  
16.32 
53.04 46.83 39.83  36.23  
Ecuador 76.70  24.8 51.44 28.92 50.87  43.02  
El Salvador 70.72  14.84 39.73 37.80 40.34  28.48  
Guatemala 80.35  19.57 49.77 24.28 44.38  31.96  
Guyana 71.66  19.96 49.16 27.65 50.90  43.30  
Haiti 56.41  48.24 33.23 27.75 23.75  17.72  
Honduras 76.48  13.79 30.54 36.20 41.58 38.34  
Jamaica 85.64  24.54 45.58 45.32 40.62  31.00  
Mexico 74.37  30.32 47.71 35.22 47.81  38.17  
Nicaragua 74.27  16.62 33.88 27.20 36.01  25.32  
Panama 70.16  9.17 37.52 32.29 43.97  37.31  
Paraguay 78.05  18.18 15.39 37.05 49.42  24.31  
Peru 75.81  27.06 32.44 31.69 45.86  38.37  
Uruguay 63.05  8.86 56.15 42.92 50.58  46.91  
Venezuela 79.87  
10.6 
38.90 39.02 52.77  44.90  
Total Sample 72.08  
20.30 
43.68 33.55 46.14 38.02  
 All variables were recoded on a 0-100 scale with the purpose of simplifying interpretation. 
Exact wording can be found online at www.AmericasBarometer.org 



























































Argentina 10.887 36.651 51.30 3.615 6.01 5.321 
Belize 8.271 37.003 49.35 2.173 14.11 4.148 
Bolivia 9.945 36.897 49.70 2.514 4.73 2.932 
Brazil 7.295 41.427 53.70 3.129 13.35 4.507 
Chile 10.483 43.599 59.20 3.613 5.63 5.275 
Colombia 8.767 36.828 50.10 2.886 10.24 3.749 
Costa Rica 8.160 40.779 51.10 2.532 5.07 5.629 
Dominican 
Republic 7.316 41.171 54.80 3.114 10.96 3.679 
Ecuador 10.168 38.485 50.00 2.606 7.05 3.824 
El Salvador 8.396 38.451 52.10 2.848 8.97 3.604 
Guatemala 6.007 39.414 49.80 2.328 7.87 2.941 
Guyana 8.489 38.346 50.00 1.706 14.52 3.462 
Haiti 8.565 37.320 50.00 1.942 32.76 1.147 
Honduras 7.246 35.339 50.10 2.045 7.23 3.164 
Jamaica 9.414 43.908 50.00 2.286 18.86 3.855 
Mexico 8.269 40.841 50.50 2.953 5.39 4.980 
Nicaragua 8.005 34.151 50.00 2.589 11.11 2.610 
Panama 10.238 38.983 50.00 2.942 16.73 4.435 
Paraguay 8.992 35.736 49.70 2.570 4.71 3.659 
Peru 10.671 39.020 50.20 3.268 9.26 3.377 
Uruguay 8.984 45.296 53.40 3.622 7.93 4.903 
Venezuela 9.961 38.659 54.60 3.373 6.60 4.930 
Total Sample 8.947 39.470 51.21 2.712 10.22 3.858 
Exact wording can be found online at www.AmericasBarometer.org 
* The ―wealth‖ index consists of a count of household assets and access to basic services at the 
household level. The list of assets in the survey includes durable goods, such as a TV set, a 
refrigerator, a car, and a computer, and access to basic services like clean water and sewage inside the 
house.  
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